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In January of this year, the Delaware Supreme Court handed 
down its decision in Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 1 upholding a provi­
sion in a certificate of incorporation that designated the federal 
courts as the exclusive jurisdiction for the litigation of claims 
under the federal Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act").2 The inclu­
sion of these provisions in Delaware charters and bylaws-often 
referred to as "Federal Forum Provisions" or FFPs-raised 
important questions as to the reach of the internal affairs 
doctrine. This doctrine provides that the jurisdiction of incorpora­
tion regulates the internal affairs of its corporations: the relation­
ship among and between the corporate officers, directors and 
shareholders. Although, strictly speaking, the Court left this defi­
nition of internal affairs untouched, the practical effect of the de­
cision was, perhaps, to expand the reach of state corporate law by 
expanding the kinds of provisions that a corporation may include 
in its charter and bylaws. I will return to the implications of 
Salzberg after a summary of the opinion. 
A. The Supreme Court opinion.
The Court began its opinion quoting an example of the FFPs
from the charters of two of the three corporate parties to this lit­
igation (Stitch Fix, Inc. and Roku, Inc.): 
Unless the Company consents in writing to the selection of an 
alternative forum, the federal district courts of the United States of 
America shall be the exclusive forum for the resolution of any com• 
plaint asserting a cause of action arising under the Securities Act of 
1933. Any person or entity purchasing or otherwise acquiring any 
interest in any security of [the Company] shall be deemed to have 
notice of and consented to [this provision] .3 
The corporate parties had amended their charters to include 
FFPs before filing for their initial public offerings, presumably to 
avoid having to litigate 1933 Act claims in state court. Unlike the 
Securities Act of 1934, the 1933 Act expressly provides that 
private rights of action may be filed in either federal or state 
*Monfort Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. The author
thanks Sarah Keller, Class of 2022, for her valuable research assistance on this 
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courts. It is likely that the corporate parties preferred to litigate 
any such claims in federal court, where the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) would apply. The PSLRA 
includes various provisions generally perceived as less favorable 
to plaintiffs than state law. 
The FFPs in this case were challenged on the basis of two 
arguments: first, that FFPs do not relate to the internal affairs of 
the corporation and, therefore, are beyond the jurisdiction of 
state law; and second, provisions added to the Delaware General 
Corporation Law (DGCL) in 2015 at least implicitly preclude 
such provisions. Focusing on the former argument, the Chancery 
Court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment,4 writing 
that "the constitutive documents of a Delaware corporation can­
not bind a plaintiff to a particular forum when the claim does not 
involve rights or relationships that were established by or under 
Delaware's corporate law."5 Because "the Federal Forum Provi­
sions attempt to accomplish that feat," the court held that the 
provisions are "ineffective and invalid ."6 
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed.7 The Court began its
analysis with Section 102(b)(l) of the DGCL, which provides, 
generally, what may be set forth in a Delaware certificate ·of 
incorporation. It allows "any provision for the management of the 
business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and 
any provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the pow­
ers of the corporation, the directors, and the stockholders . . ."8 
Deconstructing this provision, the Court noted that it authorizes 
"two broad types of provisions: any provision for the management 
of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corpora­
tion, and any provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating 
the powers of the corporation, the directors, and the stockholders, 
or any class of the stockholders, . . . if such provisions are not 
contrary to the laws of this State."9 The Court followed this with
its conclusion: FFPs are facially valid and fall within either of 
these categories because they seek to regulate the forum in which 
"intra-corporate" litigation may take place.10 
The impetus for FFPs was triggered by the U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement 
Fund, 11 which held that federal and state courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction over claims under the 1933 Act, and that such claims 
if filed in state court are not removable to federal court. This 
holding led to a dramatic increase in 1933 Act claims in state 
court and in parallel class actions filed in both state and federal 
courts. The result was a chaotic and, in some cases, an unmanage­
able situation ,fof · corporate defendants. Thus, the Delaware 
Supreme Court:;concluded, FFPs were necessary to ensure 
"judicial economy and avoid duplicative efforts among courts in 
• 
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resolving disputes."12 
The Court also rationalized its holding on the basis of private 
ordering, noting that since charter amendments require stock­
holder approval and are considered "contracts among a corpora­
tion's stockholders"13 they "should be respected as a matter of 
policy."14 
Finally, the Court dealt with two arguments that plaintiffs 
relied upon: certain amendments to the DGCL adopted in 2015 
and the case of ATP Tour, Inc v. Deutscher Tennis Bund. 15 Among 
other things, the 2015 amendments added § 115, which autho­
rized charter provisions that designated Delaware as the 
exclusive jurisdiction for "internal corporate claims" and defined 
that term as claims "(i) that are based upon a violation of a duty 
by a current or former director or officer or stockholder in such 
capacity, or (ii) as to which this title confers jurisdiction upon the 
Court of Chancery. "18 • sion also invalidates charter pro­
visions that prohibit Delaware courts from hearing such claims. 
Plaintiffs' argument with respect to the 2015 amendments thus 
rested on the implication that because § 115 did not explicitly al­
low provisions like FFPs, it implicitly forbade them. The Court 
rejected this argument, relying primarily on traditional rules of 
statutory interpretation and on what it called a ''holistic reading'' 
of § 115. That section was limited, by its terms, to "internal. 
corporate claims" while FFPs address 1933 Act claims, which are 
quite different. Indeed, the Court noted that federal courts are 
"most experienced in adjudicating them." 
Plaintiff's argument based on ATP, though successful in the 
Chancery Court, did not persuade the Supreme Court. In ATP 
the Delaware Supreme Court had answered a certified question 
on referral from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit regarding a fee-shifting provision in the bylaws of a Dela­
ware nonstock corporation. A member of the corporation chal­
lenged the fee-shifting provision following an unsuccessful claim 
against the corporation under the federal antitrust laws, Dela­
ware fiduciary law principles, and other claims. The Delaware 
Court advised the federal court that the fee-shifting bylaw was 
facially valid. Plaintiffs in the Salzberg litigation argued that the 
Court in ATP upheld the fee-shifting provision because the 
underlying litigation involved claims under Delaware law (among 
other claims) and, therefore, the bylaw dealt with "internal af­
fairs," a permissible subject for bylaws. FFPs, however, relate to 
claims governed by federal law and, therefore,. are beyond the 
scope of permissible bylaws. On this argument the Court made 
perhaps the most important pronouncement in the case: claims 
under Section 11 of the 1933 Act "are 'internal' 'in the sense that 
they arise from internal corporate conduct on the part of the 
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its impact on the internal affairs doctrine. It was on this basis 
that the Chancery Court held the FFPs were not enforceable: 
they went beyond the internal affairs of the corporation. The 
Supreme Court held that charter provisions are not limited to 
internal affairs; such provisions need only be within the limita­
tions of DGCL § 102(b)(l). A robust view of this section would 
justify a charter provision that, say, mandates arbitration for 
claims br t by stockholders under the federal securities laws. 24 
Whether the charter ( or bylaw) provision is a forum selection 
provision or an arbitration provision, the claim may be brought 
outside of Delaware in defiance of the provision. The court would 
have to decide whether the robust reading of the Salzberg court 
should be followed or the traditional internal affairs doctrine, as 
articulated by the Chancery Court in this litigation. Given how 
zealously courts tend to guard their jurisdiction,21 the corporate 
defendant may not fare well. 
Another possible challenge to the internal affairs doctrine 
comes from the opposite direction: state statutory law that does 
relates to the internal affairs of corporations chartered elsewhere 
but headquartered or at least doing business within the state 
enacting the law. A recent California law, for instance, mandates 
gender diversity on the boards of publicly held corporations 
headquartered in California. 28 The composition of a corporate 
board of directors is arguably the quintessential internal affair, 
but California courts are unlikely to deny enforcement of its law­
which is grounded on public policy-even if the foreign corpora­
tion, headquartered in California, had a charter provision that 
conflicted with the California mandate. That development may 
prompt other states to attempt similar forays into regulations 
and laws that encroach on the internal affairs of foreign corpora­
tions subject to its jurisdiction with the resulting dilution of the 
internal affairs doctrine. 
Delaware legislators· should take note of these developments. 
Ai!J Professor Manesh has noted, if Delaware corporations are too 
aggressive in defining the rights of their shareholders, particu-
larly in the area of federal law, they invite federal regulation.27 If 
the California le tion is upheld, other states may decide to 
regulate foreign corporations within their jurisdiction even if that 
regulation falls within the traditional view of the internal affairs 
doctrine, as articulated by the Chancery Court in this case. 
Combined, these developments threaten the hegemony of Dela­
ware as a place to incorporate. 28 That, in turn, also threatens and 
puts in jeopardy the fiscal benefits to incurporating in Delaware.29 
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C. Questions left open by the opinion.
1. What about claims against underwriters and other
professionals?
Salzberg only upheld the facial validity of FFPs that relate to
1933 Act claims against the corporation and its officers and 
directors. But 1933 Act claims typically include claims against 
underwriters and other professionals connected to the public of­
fering, some of whom (particularly underwriters) may have agree­
ments requiri the corporation to indemnify them. This raises 
the question whether 1933 Act claims may proceed against 
those defendants in state court while a parallel action proceeds 
in federal court against the corporation and its officers and 
directors. The answer appears to be yes. This, in turn, suggests 
that underwriters may require their Initial Public Offering (IPO) 
clients to remove FFPs from their Delaware certificates of 




What about claims made by investors who were not 
shareholders of the corporation at the time that they 
made the investment that is the subject of the liti­
gation? 
The Salzberg court rationalized its decision, in part, on private 
ordering. The shareholders had agreed to the provision and 
should be bound by it. But if the purchaser in an IPO was not a 
shareholder before the investment, can it be argued that there 
was a contractual agreement between the corporation and the in­
vestor?30 The corporation could argue that a purchaser of its stock 
makes that investment "knowing'' of and "accepting" the terms of 
the charter and bylaws so, yes, there is a contract. This scenario 
may be one in which a future court limits the reach of Salzberg 
and rules that it only applies if the claimant was a stockholder at 
the time of the stock acquisition in question. 
3. May FFPs be included in bylaws?
The bylaws of a Delaware corporation may contain provisions
that are similar to those permitted in the certificate of 
incorporation. Section 109(b) of the DGCL provides: "The bylaws 
may contain any provision, not inconsistent with law . . ., relat­
ing to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs 
and the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or 
employees."31 By comparison, the language in § 102(b)(l) permits 
provisions "for the management of the business" and provisions 
"creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the 
corporation, the directors, and the stockholders . .. "32 So, the 
relevant question is whether FFPs relate to the business of the 
corporation or the rights or powers of its stockholders. At least 
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arguably, they do. Further, if the certificate of incorporation al­
lows directors to amend the bylaws, FFPs may be imposed by the 
directors acting without stockholder approval. 
4. Under what circumstances may a Delaware court.
deny enforcement of an FFP?
The Supreme Court in Salzberg emphasized that the FFPs 
before it were facially valid and enforceable, implying that there 
may be circumstances in which such a provision would not be 
enforced. One example may be when the plaintiff is not a 
stockholder before becoming the subject of the 1933 Act complaint. 
Under those· circumstances, the plaintiff might argue that a 
charter provision cannot limit the rights of a person whose cause 
of action arose simultaneously with becoming a stockholder. Note, 
as well, if the litigation is filed in a state court outside of Dela­
ware, the court might rule that the FFP cannot limit its jurisdic­
tion and are inconsistent with its law. Finally, the Salzberg court 
recognized three circumstances under which an FFP might not 
be enforced: "There are three bases on which forum-selection pro­
visions might be invalidated on an 'as applied' basis: (i) they will 
not be enforced if doing so would be unreasonable and unjust; (ii) 
they would be invalid for reasons such as fraud or overreaching; 
or (iii) they could be not enforced if they contravened a strong 
public policy of the forum in which suit is brought, whether 
declared by statute or by judicial decision."� 
As to first circumstance, the U.S. Supreme Court indicated 
that the relevant criterion is whether "trial in the contractual 
forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will 
for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court. "34 
Otherwise, "there is no basis for concluding that it would be 
unfair, unjust, or unreasonable to hold that party to his bargain."35 
It seems unlikely that a plaintiff could prevail on this test: not 
only does the 1933 Act provide that actions may be filed in federal 
court, but federal courts are likely to be more experienced in 
resolving such actions than are state courts. 
As to "fraud and overreaching," this too seems like a high 
hurdle for plaintiffs challenging FFPs. By definition, these provi­
sions are set forth in the bylaws or charter, and most likely· the 
latter. In turn, these documents are filed as part of the registra­
tion statement and the FFP may be specifically mentione� in the 
prospectus.� 
Finally, an FFP does not appear to contravene any, state public 
policy, much less a strong one. A state would have to adopt a stat­
ute or a state court would have decide a case that articulates a 
state policy against litigating a federal cause ofaction in a federal 
court. This is hard to imagine. 38 
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5. Does the 1933 Act preempt an FFP?
As the 1933 Act expressly provides actions may be brought in
federal or state court, a preemption argument may be asserted 
that precluding state court actions is preempted. While this ques­
tion has not been addressed, it is worth noting that in Rodriguez 
de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court 
upheld an arbitration provision that implicitly precluded state 
court litigation under the 1933 Act. 37 
D. Some Concluding Thoughts.
The public policy ramifications of the Salzberg decision has at
least two aspects. First, is the decision's impact on the concept of 
internal affairs. At its core, that doctrine limits the reach of state 
corporate law, and at the same time is protective of state 
corporate law. A state can legislate, for instance, that corpora­
tions chartered there must give shareholders at least 10 days' no­
tice of a shareholders meeting, and other states may not extend 
that period for corporations doing business or holding shareholder 
meetings there, but chartered elsewhere. The doctrine thus clari­
fies which state's laws apply in a given controversy. In Salzberg, 
however, there arguably was such a conflict: federal law provided 
that 1933 Act claims may be filed in federal or state court, while 
the corporate charters in Salzberg, sanctioned by the Court's de-· 
cision, provided that such claims against the corporation may be 
filed only in federal court. More importantly, the Court rejected 
the Chancery Court decision that invalidated the FFPs on the 
basis that they addressed a matter beyond the corporations' 
internal affairs holding, instead, that Delaware charters are not 
bound by the internal affairs doctrine. Rather, at least with re­
spect to forum selection provisions, it is enough if the matter to 
be litigated relates to "intra-corporate" matters which, in turn, 
the Court defined broadly. Thus, while the Delaware corporate 
code did not, expressly, extend the internal affairs doctrine, the 
Salzberg Court authorized corporations to do so in their certifi­
cates of incorporation, a sort of backdoor extension of the inte�nal 
affairs doctrine. 
Second, it is important to recognize the context of the decision. 
The corporate defendants in Salzberg reacted to a very real 
problem in a creative way.38 To limit the risk of costly and duplica­
tive litigation that might follow a public offering of stock, they 
included FFPs in their charters. The underlying policy question 
is whether this is an appropriate role for private ordering. When 
Congress enacted the 1933 Act and provided that claims thereun­
der may be brought in either federal or state court, it did not 
preface the provision with "unless otherwise agreed." The very 
real threat of frivolous securities litigation has motivated all 
sorts of responses, including, of course, the enactment of the 
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PSLRA itself FFPs are just another response in what seems to 
be an ongoing battle, suggesting that it may be time for Congress 
to re-visit the question of securities litigation. So, while Salzberg 
is nominally about private ordering and the internal affairs doc­
trine, it is also about corporations trying to limit litigation. If the 
,Salzberg decision survives, if state courts outside of Delaware 
honor FFPs and dismiss 1933 Act litigation, and if Congress does 
not respond, then private ordering will have achieved an 
important victory. But, this scenario seems unlikely and the 
Salzberg victory may be short lived. 
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